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Abstract
This paper focuses on how education costs affect the political determination
of redistribution policy via individual decision-making on education. For cases of
high costs, there are multiple equilibria: the high-tax equilibrium featured by the
minority of highly educated individuals and a large size of the government, and the
low-tax equilibrium featured by the majority of highly educated individuals and a
small size of the government. For cases of low costs, there is a unique equilibrium
featured by the majority of highly educated individuals and a large size of the
government.
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1 Introduction
For the past few decades, there has been growing concern about the political process of
the determination of redistribution policy in macroeconomics (see Galasso and Profeta,
2002, and the references therein). Several earlier papers analyzed this issue by assuming
myopic voting behavior (for example, Verbon and Verhoeven, 1992; Alesina and Rodrik,
1994; Meijdam and Verbon, 1996) or once-and-for-all voting (for example, Boadway and
Wildasin, 1989; Bertola, 1993; Casamatta et al., 2000). In other words, they investigated
the issue under the environment of the absence of dynamic interaction between redistribu-
tion policy and individual decision-making. However, as represented by the pay-as-you-go
public pension, redistribution policy has a dynamic or an intergenerational aspect in na-
ture, implying that there is a feedback mechanism between redistribution policy and
individual decision-making. Expectations about future redistribution policy affect the
current individuals’ decision-making on saving or educational investment, which, in turn,
has an effect on the future distribution of income and, thus, on the future voting behavior
over redistribution policy. Therefore, there is a need to incorporate this mechanism into
the analysis of political economy of redistribution.
Recently, Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2007) have provided politico-
economic frameworks that incorporate this feedback mechanism, and have shown that
the mechanism results in multiple political equilibria: the pro-welfare state and the anti-
welfare state. In the pro-welfare state, expectations of higher future redistribution lead
to lower educational investments and, thus, to a lower proportion of highly educated in-
dividuals. This implies a larger size of low-income individuals, which, in turn, increases
future demand for redistribution, resulting in a higher tax rate and a larger size of the
government. In the antiwelfare state, expectations of lower future redistribution lead to
higher educational investments and, thus, to a higher proportion of highly educated in-
dividuals. This implies a larger size of high-income individuals, which, in turn, decreases
future demand for redistribution, resulting in a lower tax rate and a smaller size of the
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government.1
Their two predictions provide explanations for the empirical observations in many
OECD countries. Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of graduation rates of tertiary educa-
tion and the ratios of public social expenditure to GDP in 2003 for OECD countries.2 We
take the graduation rate as a proxy variable of the proportion of highly educated indi-
viduals and the ratio of public social expenditure to GDP as a proxy variable of the size
of the government. The prediction of the pro-welfare state is consistent with empirical
observations in Continental European countries like Austria, France, Germany and Italy,
and the prediction of the antiwelfare state is consistent with observations in Australia,
Iceland, Ireland, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Therefore, the the-
ory of Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2007) contributes to the understanding of
the difference with respect to welfare programs among some OECD countries that share
similar political backgrounds. However, their model does not fully explain the empirical
observations in Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) that expe-
rience higher graduation rates and larger sizes of governments among OECD countries.
The aim of this paper is to provide a framework that provides the third prediction, which
was not shown by Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2007).
[Figure 1 around here.]
For the purpose of analysis, we focus on education costs in the model of Hassler et al.
1The difference between Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2007) is that Hassler et al. (2003)
assume age-independent taxation whereas Hassler et al. (2007) assume age-dependent taxation. The age-
independent taxation creates a dynamic connection between the taxation of the old and the educational
investment of the young, which produces the persistence effect of the state variable, i.e., the proportion
of the highly educated individuals. In contrast, the age-dependent taxation breaks this link and, thus,
produces a stationary property of equilibrium that makes the analysis more tractable. However, the
assumption of age-dependent taxation still keeps the property of the feedback mechanism on which we
focus here.
2The data on graduation rates of tertiary education (type A) are based on OECD (2005). The tertiary
type A course is largely theory-based and designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry to advanced
research programs and professions with high skill requirements. There is another course (type B) that
is shorter than the type A and it focuses on practical, technical or occupational skills for direct entry
into the labor market. We here focus on tertiary type A education from the viewpoint of suitability for
our analysis. The data on public social expenditure to GDP are based on OECD (2007). Public social
expenditure comprises cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with
social purposes.
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(2007) and extend their model by generalizing the education cost function. Hassler et al.
(2007) assumed that the cost of investment in education e, which can be interpreted as
the disutility of educational effort, is given by (e)2, while we assume that it is given by
η · (e)2 where η > 0. For cases of high values of η, with Hassler et al. (2007) (η = 1) as a
special case, individuals have a weak incentive to invest in education, which results in a
similar equilibrium characterization to Hassler et al. (2007): the economy attains the pro-
welfare state or the antiwelfare state depending on expectations by individuals. However,
for cases of low values of η, individuals have a strong incentive to invest in education
even if they expect a high future tax rate and, thus, a low return from the investment.
Therefore, for cases of low education costs, the economy attains a state featured by a
large proportion of highly educated individuals and a large size of the government. The
generalization of the education cost function creates the third prediction, which was not
presented by Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2007).
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
characterizes the political equilibrium and explores empirical implications of our result.
Section 4 characterizes the Ramsey allocation to evaluate the efficiency of the political
equilibrium. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The model is based on that developed by Hassler et al. (2007). Time is discrete and
denoted by t = 1, 2, · · · . The economy consists of a continuum of agents living for two
periods. Each generation has a unit mass. Agents are, at birth, of two types: high ability
and low ability, in proportions µ(> 1/2) and 1 − µ(≤ 1/2), respectively. The role of the
assumption µ > 1/2 is discussed in Section 3.
High-ability agents can affect their prospects in life by an educational investment.
In particular, they either become rich or poor, and by undertaking a costly investment
can increase the probability e of becoming rich. The cost of investment, which can be
interpreted as the disutility of educational effort, is given by η · (e)2, η > 0: Hassler et
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al. (2007) considered the special case of η = 1. Low-ability agents make no investment
choice: irrespective of their private actions, they are deemed to be in poverty. Rich agents
earn a high wage, normalized to unity, in both periods, whereas poor agents earn a low
wage, normalized to zero.
The government provides transfers (s) financed by taxes levied on the rich. The tax
rates are age dependent, τ o for the old and τ y for the young.3 The tax rates are determined
before the young agents decide on their investment. The government budget balances in
every period.4
There is no storage technology in this economy. Each individual uses up his/her
endowments within a period. Therefore, the expected utility of agents alive at time t is
given as follows:
V ost = 1− τ ot + st,
V out = V
ol
t = st,
V yt = et · {(1− τ yt ) + β(1− τ ot+1)}+ (st + βst+1)− η(et)2,
V ylt = (st + βst+1),
where V ost , V
ou
t , and V
ol
t denote the utility of the old who were successful in youth, the
old who were unsuccessful in youth, and old low-ability types in period t, and V yt and
V ylt denote expected utility of young high-ability and young low-ability agents born in
period t. Note that V yt is computed prior to individual success or failure. The parameter
β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
3We can alternatively assume age-independent taxation (Hassler et al., 2003) that creates a dynamic
connection between the taxation of the old and the investment of the young (see Hassler et al. (2007)
Section 6 for a discussion). Because our focus is on the role of education costs, we follow the assumption
of age-dependent taxes in Hassler et al. (2007).
4Hassler et al. (2007) assumed that the government provides transfers (s) as well as public goods
(g). We abstract from public goods provision in our analysis for simplicity of exposition. However, this
simplification does not qualitatively affect the result shown below.
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Given these preferences, the optimal investment of young high-ability agents is:
e∗(τ yt , τ
o
t+1) =
1
2η
(1 + β − τ yt − βτ ot+1). (1)
Because high-ability agents are identical ex ante, agents of the same cohort choose the
same investment, implying that the proportion of old poor among high-ability agents in
period t+ 1 is given by:
ut+1 ≡ 1− e∗(τ yt , τ ot+1) =
1
2η
(2η − (1 + β) + τ yt + βτ ot+1).
Thus, the proportion of old poor among high-ability agents in period t+1, ut+1, depends
on the income tax rate levied on the young rich in period t, τ yt , and the discounted tax
rate levied on the old rich in period t+ 1, βτ ot+1.
5
The government runs a balanced budget in every period, implying that the budget
can be expressed as:
2st = µ(1− ut)τ ot + µe∗(τ yt , τ ot+1)τ yt
= W (ut, τ
o
t ) + Z(τ
y
t , τ
o
t+1), (2)
where W (ut, τ
o
t ) ≡ µ(1 − ut)τ ot is the tax revenue financed by the old, and Z(τ yt , τ ot+1) ≡
µe∗(τ yt , τ
o
t+1)τ
y
t is the tax revenue financed by the young.
3 Political Equilibrium
This section characterizes a political equilibrium where agents vote on taxation, period
by period. Section 3.1 provides the definition of political equilibrium based on the con-
cept of Markov perfect equilibrium with majority voting. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 provide
characterization of political equilibrium classified according to the pattern of taxation on
5When we characterize a political equilibrium (defined below) in the next section, we check whether
or not the levels of e∗ and u are given within the range (0, 1).
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the old, and discuss the role of education costs in determining the properties of political
equilibrium. Section 3.4 discusses empirical implications of our model.
3.1 Definition of Political Equilibrium
Following Hassler et al. (2007), it is assumed that agents vote on current taxes at the
beginning of each period but that only the old vote.6 The respective utility of the old rich
and the old poor can be written as:
V ost = 1− τ ot +
1
2
· (W (ut, τ ot ) + Z(τ yt , τ ot+1)) ,
V out = V
ol
t =
1
2
· (W (ut, τ ot ) + Z(τ yt , τ ot+1)) .
Whatever the level of ut, the old rich would never tax themselves to finance transfers
because the marginal cost of taxation is greater than the marginal benefit of taxation:
∂V ost /∂τ
o
t = −1 + µ(1 − ut)/2 < 0. However, the old poor prefer taxation on the old
because they pay no tax but benefit from transfer: ∂V out /∂τ
o
t = µ(1 − ut)/2 > 0. Thus,
the rich prefer a zero tax rate on the old, while the poor prefer 100% taxation on the old.
As for the choice of τ yt , the old agents have the same political aim irrespective of their
type: they wish to maximize the revenue from the young, Z(τ yt , τ
o
t+1).
We now provide the definition of political equilibrium. The current paper focuses on
stationary Markov-perfect equilibria, where the state of the economy is summarized by
the proportion of the current old poor among high ability agents (ut).
Definition: A (stationary Markov perfect) political equilibrium is defined as a triplet of
functions {T o, T y, U}, where T o : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and T y : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → [0, 1] are
two public policy rules, τ ot = T
o(ut) and τ
y
t = T
y, and U : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a private
decision rule, ut+1 = U(τ
y
t ), such that the following functional equations hold:
6For discussion about the role of this assumption, see Section IIB in Hassler et al. (2003) and Section
6 in Hassler et al. (2007).
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1. T o(ut) = argmaxτot ∈[0,1]W
dec(τ ot , ut), where:
W dec(τ ot , ut) =
 1− τ
o
t +
1
2
W (ut, τ
o
t ) if ut ≤ 1− 1/2µ,
1
2
W (ut, τ
o
t ) if ut > 1− 1/2µ.
2. U(τ yt ) = 1− e∗(τ yt , τ ot+1), with τ ot+1 = T o(U(τ yt )).
3. T y = argmaxτyt ∈[0,1] Z(τ
y
t , τ
o
t+1) subject to τ
o
t+1 = T
o(U(τ yt )).
The first equilibrium condition requires that τ ot maximizes the utility of the decisive
old voter who is either the old rich (if ut ≤ 1− 1/2µ) or the old poor (if ut > 1− 1/2µ).
We assume that the rich decide τ ot in the case of an equal number of rich and poor voters
(ut = 1− 1/2µ).7 The second equilibrium condition implies that all young agents choose
their investments optimally, given τ yt and τ
o
t+1, and that agents hold rational expectations
about future taxes and distributions of types. The third equilibrium condition requires
that τ yt maximizes the objective function of the decisive voter.
3.2 The Determination of T o and U
We now solve the three equilibrium conditions recursively. The mapping T o(·) that sat-
isfies equilibrium condition 1 is given by:
T o(ut) =
 0 if ut ≤ 1− 1/2µ,1 if ut > 1− 1/2µ. (3)
The decisive voter will set τ ot = 0 if the rich are the majority: µ(1 − ut) ≥ 1/2, i.e.,
ut ≤ 1 − 1/2µ, whereas it will set τ ot = 1 if the poor are the majority: µ(1 − ut) < 1/2,
i.e., ut > 1− 1/2µ.
Next, we rewrite equilibrium condition 2 by substituting in the optimal investment
7Recall that we have assumed µ > 1/2 in Section 2. If µ ≤ 1/2, then µ(1 − ut) < 1/2 always holds:
there is no opportunity for the rich to become the majority of voters. In order to present a case where
the rich are the majority, we have adopted the assumption of µ > 1/2.
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e∗(τ yt , τ
o
t+1). This yields the following functional equation:
U(τ yt ) =
1
2η
(2η − (1 + β) + τ yt + βT o(U(τ yt ))) . (4)
Because T o(·) ∈ {0, 1} is given by (3), any solution of (4) must be a combination of the two
linear functions: U(τ yt ) = (2η − (1 + β) + τ yt ) /2η if T o = 0 and U(τ yt ) = (2η − 1 + τ yt ) /2η
if T o = 1.
Under the assumption of rational expectations about future taxes and distributions of
types, any solution to the functional equation (4) is given by:
U(τ yt ) =

(2η − (1 + β) + τ yt )/2η if τ yt ≤ 1− η/µ
{(2η − (1 + β) + τ yt )/2η, (2η − 1 + τ yt )/2η} if 1− η/µ < τ yt ≤ 1− η/µ+ β
(2η − 1 + τ yt )/2η if 1− η/µ+ β < τ yt .
(5)
Suppose that young agents in period t expect τ ot+1 = 0 (τ
o
t+1 = 1): the rich (poor) old
are the majority of voters in period t + 1. Under this expectation, young agents choose
their investments as e∗(τ yt , 0)(e
∗(τ yt , 1)). This expectation is rational if µe
∗(τ yt , 0) ≥ 1/2
(if µe∗(τ yt , 1) < 1/2), that is, if τ
y
t ≤ 1 − η/µ + β (if 1 − η/µ < τ yt ). Figure 2 illustrates
possible cases of U that satisfy the second equilibrium condition (5). The solid lines show
the graphs of U satisfying equilibrium condition 2. Since our focus is on the educational
costs, these cases are classified according to the size of η/µ.
[Figure 2 around here.]
Suppose that the costs of education are high such that η/µ > 1 (see Panels (a)
and (b)). A high η implies that educational investment is costly, thereby giving the
high-skilled individuals a disincentive to invest in education. Thus, a high η results
in a low probability of being successful, and the majority in the next period can be
poor ∀τ yt ∈ [0, 1]. Alternatively, suppose that the costs of education are low such that
η/µ ∈ (0, 1] (see Panels (c) and (d)). The high-skilled individuals have a strong incentive
to invest in education, which results in a high probability of being successful. Thus, the
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majority in the next period can be rich for τ yt ∈ [0,min(1− η/µ+ β, 1)]. In particular, if
τ yt ≤ 1− η/µ, the majority in the next period are always the rich.
Hassler et al. (2007) ignored the cases displayed in Panels (c) and (d) by assuming a
specific form of education cost function with η = 1. If η = 1, there is no τ yt ∈ [0, 1] that
satisfies τ yt ≤ 1 − η/µ: there is no case in which the majority, in the next period, are
always the rich. Their analysis was therefore limited to the cases illustrated in Panels (a)
and (b). The current paper extends the model of Hassler et al. (2007) by generalizing
the cost function of education, and shows that in the cases presented in Panels (c) and
(d), there is a political equilibrium whose outcome is qualitatively different from Hassler
et al. (2007).
As depicted in Figure 2, there are multiple, self-fulfilling expectations of U for a
certain set of τ yt . Which U arises in equilibrium depends on the expectations of agents.
To illustrate U in equilibrium, let us define the critical rate of τ yt : θ ∈ (max(0, 1 −
η/µ),min(1 − η/µ + β, 1)]. The rate θ, which depends on the expectations of agents, is
the highest tax rate that yields a majority of old rich in the next period. For τ yt > θ, the
majority is the poor. However, for τ yt ≤ θ, the majority in the next period is either the
rich or the poor depending on expectations by agents. Thus, the equilibrium features a
monotonic or a nonmonotonic function U. Without loss of generality, we hereafter focus
our attention on equilibria featuring a monotonic function U (Figure 3).8 The function
U is thus given by:
U(τ yt ) =
 (2η − (1 + β) + τ
y
t ) /2η if τ
y
t ≤ θ,
(2η − 1 + τ yt ) /2η if τ yt > θ.
(6)
[Figure 3 around here.]
8As shown in Hassler et al. (2007), this restriction does not qualitatively affect the equilibrium
outcome.
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3.3 The Determination of T y and the Characterization of Polit-
ical Equilibria
Given the characterization of T o and U satisfying equilibrium conditions 1 and 2, re-
spectively, we now consider the political determination of τ yt that satisfies equilibrium
condition 3. Because there are two possible solutions of U, we introduce the correspond-
ing definitions of political equilibria: a high-tax equilibrium featured by τ o = 1 and a
low-tax equilibrium featured by τ o = 0. In the high-tax equilibrium, agents choose τ yt to
induce a majority of poor at t+ 1; they maximize the tax revenue financed by the young
Z(τ yt , 1). In the low-tax equilibrium, agents choose τ
y
t to induce a majority of rich at t+1;
they maximize the tax revenue financed by the young Z(τ yt , 0). We first characterize a
high-tax equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Suppose that β < (η/µ − 1/2)2/(1 − η/µ) holds. There exists a set
of high-tax equilibria such that∀t, T o(ut) is given by (3), T y = 1/2, and U is given
by (6). The equilibrium outcome is unique and such that ∀t, τ yt = 1/2, τ ot = 1,
ut = 1− 1/4η, and 2st = 3µ/8η.
Proof. See Appendix.
Suppose that agents choose τ yt to induce a future majority of poor. In cases illustrated
in Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2, agents can choose τ yt ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes Z(τ yt , 1):
τ yt = arg max
τyt ∈[0,1]
Z(τ yt , 1) =
1
2
.
The young agents are taxed on the top of the Laffer curve, conditional on their expecting
100% taxation when old. In the case illustrated in Panel (a), voting that induces a future
majority of poor is the only option; a high-tax equilibrium is sustained by setting τ yt = 1/2.
However, in the case illustrated in Panel (b), voting that induces a future majority of rich
can be an alternative option for τ yt ∈ [0, 1+ β− η/µ]. In this case, a high-tax equilibrium
is sustained if Z(1/2, 1) > Z(τ yt , 0) for all τ
y
t inducing a future majority of rich. Z(τ
y
t , 0)
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is maximized by setting τ yt = θ because (i) setting argmaxτyt ∈[0,1] Z(τ
y
t , 0) = (1 + β)/2
is impossible in the current case, and (ii) θ(≤ 1 + β − η/µ) is the highest tax rate
that induces a future majority of rich. Therefore, a high-tax equilibrium is sustained if
Z(1/2, 1) > Z(θ, 0), i.e., if the expectation parameter θ is set below the critical level:
θ < θ˜(β) ≡
(
1 + β −√β(β + 2)) /2. This implies that, for the case illustrated in Panel
(b), the existence of the high-tax equilibrium depends on the expectations by agents.
In cases illustrated in Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2, we still have an option that induces
a future majority of poor by setting τ yt = 1/2. However, there is an alternative option that
induces a future majority of rich by choosing τ yt ∈ [0,min(1 + β − η/µ, 1)]. In particular,
if (1 + β)/2 ≤ 1 − η/µ, agents can definitely induce a future majority of rich by setting
τ yt = argmaxτyt ∈[0,1] Z(τ
y
t , 0) = (1 + β)/2. Because Z((1 + β)/2, 0) > Z(1/2, 1) holds, a
high-tax equilibrium is not sustained as an equilibrium. Based on this consideration, we
can conclude that a high-tax equilibrium is sustained if (i) setting τ yt = (1 + β)/2 is not
possible: (1 + β)/2 > 1− η/µ, (ii) the expectation θ is low such that a future majority of
poor will be induced: θ ∈ (1−η/µ, (1+β)/2), and (iii) Z(1/2, 1) > Z(θ, 0), i.e., θ < θ˜(β).
The second and the third conditions require that θ is set within the range (1−η/µ, θ˜(β)).
The condition β < (η/µ− 1/2)2/(1− η/µ), which includes the first condition, guarantees
that the range is not empty. Figure 4 illustrates an example of the graph of the tax
revenue from the young, satisfying these three conditions.
[Figure 4 around here.]
Next, we characterize a low-tax equilibrium.
Proposition 2
(i) Suppose that β ≤ 1 − 2η/µ holds. There exists a set of low-tax equilibria such that
∀t, T o(ut) is given by (3), T y = (1 + β)/2, and U is given by (6). The equilibrium
outcome is unique and such that ∀t, τ yt = (1+β)/2, τ ot = 0, ut = (2η−(1+β)/2)/2η,
and 2st = µ(1 + β)
2/8η.
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(ii) Suppose that β > 1−2η/µ and β ≥ (µ/η)(η/µ−1/2)2 hold. There exists a set of low-
tax equilibria such that ∀t, T o(ut) is given by (3), T y = θ ∈
(
max(1− η/µ, θ˜(β)),
min((1 + β)/2, 1 + β − η/µ)
]
, and U is given by (6). The equilibrium outcome is
indeterminate and such that ∀t, τ yt = θ, τ ot = 0, ut = (2η − (1 + β) + θ)/2η, and
2st = µ(1− θ + β)2/2η.
Proof. See Appendix.
Suppose that agents choose τ yt to induce a future majority of rich. In the case il-
lustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 2, such a choice is unavailable for agents. In the case
illustrated in Panel (b), the decisive voter prefers the highest tax rate on the young that
induces a future majority of rich, τ yt = θ(≤ 1 + β − η/µ), because the revenue from the
young Z(τ yt , 0) is increasing in τ
y
t in the range (0, θ). Therefore, the choice of τ
y
t = θ under
the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0 is sustained as an equilibrium if Z(θ, 0) ≥ Z(1/2, 1), i.e., if
θ ≥ θ˜(β). The condition β ≥ (µ/η)(η/µ− 1/2)2 implies that the range [θ˜(β), 1+β− η/µ]
is not empty.
Next, consider the cases illustrated in Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2. If 1 − η/µ <
(1 + β)/2, i.e., if β > 1 − 2η/µ, agents have an option that induces a future majority of
rich by setting τ yt = θ. The tax rate on the young depends on the expectations by agents
(see Panel (a) of Figure 5). In particular, when the expectation is given by θ = (1+β)/2,
the young are taxed on the top of the Laffer curve. However, if (1 + β)/2 ≤ 1− η/µ, i.e.,
if β ≤ 1− 2η/µ, expectations no longer affect the determination of τ yt . Voters can choose
τ yt = (1 + β)/2 and maximize the revenue from the young by taxing on the top of the
Laffer curve (see Panel (b) of Figure 5).
[Figure 5 around here.]
Figure 6 illustrates the parameter conditions derived in Propositions 1 and 2. The
next proposition summarizes the results established so far. The proof of the proposition
is immediate from Figure 6.
[Figure 6 around here.]
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Proposition 3
(i) If β < (µ/η)(η/µ− 1/2)2, there exists a unique high-tax equilibrium as in Proposition
1.
(ii) If (µ/η)(η/µ−1/2)2 ≤ β < (η/µ−1/2)2/(1−η/µ), the equilibrium is indeterminate.
There exist both a high-tax equilibrium as in Proposition 1 and a set of low-tax
equilibria as in Proposition 2(ii).
(iii) If β > 1 − 2η/µ and β ≥ (η/µ − 1/2)2/(1 − η/µ), there exists a set of low-tax
equilibria as in Proposition 2(ii).
(iv) If β ≤ 1− 2η/µ, there exists a unique low-tax equilibrium as in Proposition 2(i).
As illustrated in Figure 5, given µ ∈ (1/2, 1], the range of η/µ is limited to [1, 2) if
η = 1. By assuming the cost function of education with η = 1, Hassler et al. (2007)
focused on this range and showed two patterns of political equilibria, as in Proposition
3(i) and 3(ii). Contrary to their analysis, however, we focus on a wider range of η/µ by
assuming a generalized cost function. Under this extended framework, we can derive two
patterns of political equilibria, as in Proposition 3(iii) and 3(iv), which were not shown
by Hassler et al. (2007).
The mechanism behind our main finding is intuitive and can be understood as follows.
First, suppose that the investment cost is high such that η/µ > 1. In this case, it is less
attractive for agents to invest in education. When agents attach a low value to the future
such that β < (µ/η)(η/µ− 1/2)2, there is a future majority of poor irrespective of policy.
However, when agents attach a high value to the future, such that β ≥ (µ/η)(η/µ−1/2)2,
agents can undertake strategic political behavior to induce a future majority of rich. The
equilibrium is indeterminate in this case.
Second, suppose that the investment cost is low such that η/µ ≤ 1. In this case,
it is more attractive for agents to invest in education. In particular, when the cost is
sufficiently low such that β ≥ (η/µ− 1/2)2/(1− η/µ), agents have an incentive to invest
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in education even if they expect a high future tax rate and, thus, a low return from the
investment. Then, it becomes possible to tax heavily on the young without compromising
the future political equilibrium. Therefore, in this case, there is a future majority of rich
irrespective of policy.
3.4 Empirical Implications
The results established in Propositions 1–3 show that the level of government spending and
the distribution of rich and poor are affected by the parameter representing educational
cost, η. To investigate the empirical implications of η, consider two levels of η, ηH and
ηL(< ηH). Suppose that given ηH , there exist both a low-tax equilibrium and a high-tax
equilibrium, as in Proposition 3(ii). Suppose also that, given ηL, there exists a set of low-
tax equilibria as in Proposition 3(iii) or a unique low-tax equilibrium as in Proposition
3(iv).
The equilibrium level of government spending differs across political equilibria. Con-
sider first the case of η = ηH that leads to multiple equilibria. In the high-tax equilibrium,
the level of government spending is given by 3µ/8ηH . In the low-tax equilibrium, the
level, given by µ(1 − θ + β)θ/2ηH , depends on expectations by agents. The lowest level
is µ/8ηH at θ = θ˜(β), which is lower than 3µ/8ηH . The highest level is µ(1 + β)
2/8ηH
at θ = (1 + β)/2, which exceeds 3µ/8ηH if β is high. Therefore, the high-tax equilibrium
is featured by less or more spending depending on expectations by agents, θ, and the
discount factor, β.
As already shown by Hassler et al. (2007), the case of ηH provides an explanation for
the cross-country difference in the size of the government spending and the distribution of
rich and poor. To provide an empirical viewpoint, we take the entry and graduation rates
of tertiary education as proxy variables of the size of the rich µe∗. Then, the high-tax
equilibrium corresponds the some Continental European countries like Austria, France,
Germany and Italy, featured with large sizes of governments and low graduation rates; the
low-tax equilibrium corresponds to Australia, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, the United King-
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dom and the United States, featured with small sizes of government and high graduation
rates (see Figure 1).
Although the case of ηH can describe the cross-country difference among some OECD
countries, it does not fit the empirical fact of Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway
and Sweden); they have large sizes of government and high graduation rates as presented
in Figure 1. However, the case of ηL can provide an explanation for the Nordic countries.
In this case, the majority is rich, and the level of government spending is given by 2st =
µ(1 − θ + β)2/2ηL or 2st = µ(1 + β)2/8ηL, which is larger than that in the high-tax
equilibrium, 2st = 3µ/8ηH , for a small ηL and a large β. Therefore by focusing on
educational costs, we can show the equilibrium that fits the empirical fact of the Nordic
countries, which was not shown by Hassler et al. (2003)and Hassler et al. (2007).
We have shown the existence of equilibrium featured by the majority of rich and a
large size of government by considering the cases of low education costs. We can show
the existence of a qualitatively similar equilibrium by allowing the wage of the successful
agents, w, to differ from unity. A higher wage inequality results in a unique equilibrium
where the majority of rich prefer a large size of government and imposes a high tax
rate on the young (Hassler et al., 2003). However, this case does not fit the empirical
fact of the Nordic countries that are featured by low inequality (Bjo¨rklund et al., 2002).
Therefore, focusing on education costs rather than wage inequality is a key to explaining
the empirical fact of the Nordic countries in the framework of Hassler et al. (2003) and
Hassler et al. (2007).
4 Ramsey Allocation
In this section, we first characterize the Ramsey allocation, and then compare it with
the political equilibria presented in Section 3. Following Hassler et al. (2007), we define
a Ramsey allocation as a feasible plan chosen by a benevolent social planner who can
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commit to a policy sequence at time 0. The allocation solves the following problem:
max
{st,τyt ,τot }∞t=0
[βµ(1− u0)V os(s0, τ o0 ) + β(µu0 + (1− µ)H)V ou(s0, τ o0 )
+
∞∑
t=0
λt+1
{
µV y(et, st, st+1, τ
y
t , τ
o
t+1) + (1− µ)HV y(st, st+1)
}]
,
where λ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor, β(> 0) is a weight on the initial generation of old
agents, and H(≥ 1) is a bias in the planner’s preference towards low-ability agents. We
employ the same form of a social welfare function as Hassler et al. (2007) in order to
show how our extension affects the characterization of the Ramsey allocation.
Given the educational investment (1) and the government budget constraint (2), the
problem can be rewritten as a simple static problem:
max
τo0∈[0,1]
βµ(1− u0)(1− τ o0 ) + (β + λ)Aµ(1− u0)τ o0 +
L
1− λ, (7)
where
L ≡ max
{τy∈[0,1],τo∈[0,1]}
[
λµ
{
(1− τ y + β(1− τ o))e∗(τ y, τ o)− η · e∗(τ yt , τ ot+1)2
}
+(β + λ)Aµτ ye∗(τ y, τ o) + λ(β + λ)Aµτ oe∗(τ y, τ o)] ,
where A ≡ (µ+(1−µ)H)/2 is the planner’s marginal value of expenditures. The problem
implies that after the initial choice of τ o0 , the problem reduces to a sequence of identical
static optimization problems over τ y and τ o. The next proposition characterizes the
solution of the Ramsey problem.
Proposition 4: The allocation solving the Ramsey problem has
τ o0 =
 1 if A >
β
β+λ
,
0 otherwise,
and a constant sequence of taxes, τ y and τ o given by the following:
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1. Suppose that λ < β. Then,
τ y = max
{
0, (1 + β)
A− λ/(β + λ)
2A− λ/(β + λ)
}
and τ o = 0.
2. Suppose that λ > β. Then,
τ y = max
{
0,
A(1− λ)− λ/(β + λ)
2A− λ/(β + λ)
}
and τ o = min
{
1 + β
β
· A− β/(β + λ)
2A− β/(β + λ) , 1
}
.
3. Suppose that λ = β. Then,
 τ
y = τ o = 0 if A ≤ 1
2
τ y + βτ o = (2A−1)(1+β)
4A−1 if A >
1
2
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 shows that the parameter η does not affect the determination of tax
rates in the Ramsey allocation. This result depends on the cost function specified by a
quadratic form. With this feature in mind, we now summarize the solution to the Ramsey
problem as follows. First, as regards the choice of τ o0 , there is no interaction with future
variables. The planner chooses τ o0 to maximize the weighted sum of the utilities of the
initial old agents. Thus, the planner sets τ o0 = 1 if A > β/(β + λ) and τ
o
0 = 0 otherwise.
Second, the choice of τ y and τ o depends on the magnitude correlation between β and λ.
If λ < β (part 1 of Proposition 4), the tax burden falls on the young; if λ = β (part 3 of
Proposition 4), the distribution of the tax burden is indeterminate; and if λ > β (part 2
of Proposition 4), most of the tax burden falls on the old. In the case of λ > β, for a range
of a small A, the nonnegativity constraint on the young binds; for range of a large A, the
constraint of τ o ≤ 1 is binding. In words, the tax burden is increased by the planner’s
higher value to the low-ability agents.
Given the characterization of the Ramsey allocation above, we now evaluate the effi-
ciency of the political equilibria. First, consider the high-tax equilibrium. The high-tax
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equilibrium shows a qualitative similarity to the Ramsey allocation in the case of λ > β,
in that the main tax burden falls on the old. However, the tax rates in the high-tax
equilibrium are quantitatively different from those in the Ramsey allocation in the fol-
lowing two points. First, when A is low, the Ramsey planner does not tax the old at the
maximum rate. Second, in the Ramsey allocation with λ > β, the young are subject to a
tax τ y ≤ (1− λ)/2, while they are taxed at a 50% rate in the high-tax equilibrium.
Next, consider the low-tax equilibrium featured by no taxation on the old (part 2).
This equilibrium shows a qualitative similarity to the Ramsey allocation in the case of
λ < β, in that the old bear no tax burden. When the political tax rate on the young
depends on the expectations by agents as in Proposition 2(ii) the low-tax equilibrium
with τ y = θ may realize the same tax rates as those in the Ramsey allocation, depending
on the expectation θ. However, when the political tax rate on the young is determinate
as in Proposition 2(i), the low-tax equilibrium with τ y = (1 + β)/2 realizes a higher tax
burden as compared with the Ramsey allocation.9 Therefore, for low levels of η, there is
no possibility that the political equilibrium resembles the Ramsey allocation.
5 Conclusion
This paper has extended the model of Hassler et al. (2007) by generalizing the cost
function of education, which is summarized as follows. First, for high costs, with Hassler
et al. (2007) as a special case, individuals have a weak incentive to invest in education,
which results in a similar equilibrium characterization to that found in Hassler et al.
(2007). The model presents multiple equilibria: the high-tax equilibrium (the pro-welfare
state) featured by the minority of highly educated individuals and a large size of the
government; and the low-tax equilibrium (the antiwelfare state) featured by the majority
of highly educated individuals and a small size of the government. Which state is realized
9Assume that λ < β and A > λ/(β + λ): the Ramsey allocation is featured by τy = (1 + β){A −
λ/(β + λ)}/{2A − λ/(β + λ)} and τo = 0. Assume also that β < 1 − 2η/µ: the political equilibrium
is featured by τy = (1 + β)/2 and τo = 0 as in Proposition 2(i). By direct calculation, we find that
(1 + β){A− λ/(β + λ)}/{2A− λ/(β + λ)} < (1 + β)/2 is equivalent to A− λ/(β + λ) < A− λ/2(β + λ),
which holds for any A, β and λ.
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depends on expectations by individuals.
Second, for low costs, individuals have a strong incentive to invest in education irre-
spective of future redistribution policy. In this case, there is a unique equilibrium featured
by the majority of highly educated individuals and the large size of the government, which
fits the empirical facts of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden).
Furthermore, this unique equilibrium may require an excess tax burden on the young
compared with the Ramsey allocation.
The analysis in this paper focuses on the characterization of political equilibria under
a system of lump-sum general transfers paid to both the rich and the poor; we have
abstracted from targeted transfers to the elderly or to the poor. However, the paper
has provided a framework for understanding the role of education costs that affect the
political determination of redistribution policy via individual decisions on education.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that at time t, agents know that τ yt = 1/2 and expect that τ
o
t+1 = 1. Then,
1 − e∗(1/2, 1) = ut+1 = 1 − 1/4η = 1 − (1/4µ)(µ/η). Because the condition β < (η/µ −
1/2)2/(1−η/µ) ensures that η/µ > 1/2 (see Figure 6), ut+1 = 1−(1/4µ)(µ/η) > 1−1/2µ
holds for all t. By (3), this implies that τ ot+1 = 1, fulfilling initial expectations. Therefore,
there exists a high-tax equilibrium if the decisive voter finds it optimal to set τ yt = 1/2.
To establish that setting τ yt = 1/2 is optimal for the decisive voter, we note the
following properties of the function Z: (i) Z(τ yt , 0) is concave in τ
y
t and is maximized at
τ yt = (1 + β)/2; (ii) Z(τ
y
t , 0) > Z(τ
y
t , 1). Given these properties, we derive the conditions
that (i) setting τ yt = (1+β)/2 is not available under the expectation τ
o
t+1 = 0; (ii) Z(τ
y
t , 0)
is maximized at τ yt = θ; and (iii) Z(θ, 0) < Z(1/2, 1) hold. These conditions are given
by (i) (1 + β)/2 ≤ 1 − η/µ, (ii) θ ∈ (max(0, 1 − η/µ), (1 + β)/2), and (iii) θ < θ˜(β),
respectively. The second and third conditions require that θ is set within the range
(max(0, 1−η/µ), θ˜(β)). The condition β < (η/µ−1/2)2/(1−η/µ), which guarantees that
the set (max(0, 1− η/µ), θ˜(β)) is not empty, includes the first condition, as illustrated in
Figure 6. ¥
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Suppose that in period t, agents know that τ yt = (1 + β)/2 and expect that τ
o
t+1 = 0.
Then ut+1 = 1−e∗((1+β)/2, 0) = (2η−(1+β)/2) ≤ 1−1/2µ if and only if β ≥ −1+2η/µ.
The condition β ≥ −1+2η/µ holds under the assumption of β ≤ 1−2η/µ (see Figure 6).
By (3), the condition ut+1 ≤ 1− 1/2µ implies that τ ot+1 = 0, fulfilling initial expectations.
Given that Z(τ yt , 0) > Z(τ
y
t , 1)∀τ yt ∈ [0, 1] and that argmaxτyt ∈[0,1] Z(τ
y
t , 0) = (1 + β)/2,
setting τ yt = (1 + β)/2 is optimal for the decisive voter.
(ii) Under the assumption that U is monotonic, T o(U(θ)) = 0 implies that ∀τ yt ≤ θ,
T o(U(τ yt )) = 0 and U(τ
y
t ) = (2η − (1 + β) + τ yt )/2η. Consequently, the relevant payoff
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function in the range τ yt ≤ θ is Z(τ yt , 0). The function Z(τ yt , 0) is a hump-shaped function
of τ yt , with a maximum at (1 + β)/2.
Given the first assumption β > 1 − 2η/µ, i.e., 1 − η/µ < (1 + β)/2, we can consider
the following two cases: (a) the case of 1 − η/µ < (1 + β)/2 < 1 + β − η/µ and (b)
the case of 1 + β − η/µ ≤ (1 + β)/2. In case (a), Z(τ yt , 0) is increasing in the range
τ yt < (1 + β)/2 and decreasing in the range τ
y
t ≥ (1 + β)/2. In case (b), Z(τ yt , 0) is
increasing in the range τ yt < 1 + β − η/µ. Therefore, the decisive voters prefer τ yt = θ ∈
(1−η/µ,min(1+β−η/µ, (1+β)/2)] to any τ yt < θ under the assumption of β > 1−2η/µ.
An alternative option for the decisive voter is to set τ yt = 1/2 under the expectation
of τ ot+1 = 1. The choice of τ
y
t = θ under the expectation of τ
o
t+1 = 0 is sustained as an
equilibrium if Z(θ, 0) ≥ Z(1/2, 1), i.e., if θ ≥ θ˜(β), where
θ˜(β) ≡ 1 + β −
√
β(β + 2)
2
<
1 + β
2
.
Therefore, there exists a set of low-tax equilibria featured by T o(ut) is given by (3), T
y = θ
and U is given by (6) if θ is set within the range:
(
max(1− η/µ, θ˜(β)),min((1 + β)/2, 1 + β − η/µ)
]
.
The condition β ≥ (µ/η)(η/µ− 1/2)2, which is rewritten as θ˜(β) ≤ 1+β− η/µ, implying
that the above range is not empty. ¥
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
It is immediate from (7) that τ o0 = 1 if A > β/(β+λ) and τ
o
0 = 0 otherwise. The solution
of the pair (τ y, τ o) is derived by solving (8). The solution must satisfy the following
first-order conditions:
τ y :
∂L
∂τ y
− ξy + θy = 0, (8)
τ o :
∂L
∂τ o
− ξo + θo = 0, (9)
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where θy and θo are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the constraints τ y ≥ 0
and τ o ≥ 0, respectively, whereas ξy and ξo are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated
with the constraints τ y ≤ 1 and τ o ≤ 1, respectively.
Assume, first, that τ o = ξy = ξo = θy = 0. Then, we obtain
 τ
y = (1 + β) A−λ/(β+λ)
2A−λ/(β+λ) ,
θo = µA
2
2η
· (1+β)(β−λ)(β+λ)2
2A(β+λ)−λ ,
where τ y < 1 and θo > 0 as long as β > λ. This establishes part 1.
Assume, next, that τ y = ξy = ξo = θo = 0. Then, we obtain
 τ
o = 1+β
β
· A−β/(β+λ)
2A−β/(β+λ) ,
θy = µA
2
2η
· (1+β)(λ−β)(β+λ)2
β(2A(β+λ)−β) ,
where θy > 0 as long as β < λ. Furthermore, τ o < 1 holds as long as A < β/(1−β)(β+λ).
If A ≥ β/(1 − β)(β + λ), then τ o = 1 and ξo > 0. However, it remains to be checked
whether τ y = 0 continues to be a solution. Given τ o = 1, we obtain
∂L
∂τ y
− ξy + θy = 1
2η
(−λµ(1− τ y) + (β + λ)Aµ(1− λ+ 2τ y) + θy = 0.
The solution features τ y = 0 and θy > 0 if and only if A ≤ λ/(1 − λ)(β + λ). For larger
values of A, the solution instead features θy = 0 and
τ y =
A(1− λ)− λ/(β + λ)
2A− λ/(β + λ) .
This establishes part 2.
Finally, consider the case where β = λ. Then, the objective function can be written
as:
L(x) = βµ{(1 + β − x) · e∗(x)− η · e∗(x)2}+ 2βAµx · e∗(x),
where x ≡ τ y + βτ o. The first-order condition yields the result in part 3. ¥
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Figure 1: Figure 1 is a scatter plot of graduation rates of tertiary education and the ratios
of public social expenditure to GDP in 2003 for OECD countries. The solid vertical line in
the plot indicates the average graduation rate among OECD countries; the solid horizontal
line indicates the average public social expenditure to GDP among OECD countries.
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Figure 2: The figures represent the equilibrium decision rule ut+1 = U(τ
y
t ). The solid
lines show the graphs of U satisfying equilibrium condition 2. The panel (a) illustrates
the case of 1 + β < η
µ
; the panel (b) illustrates the case of 1 < η
µ
≤ 1 + β; the panel (c)
illustrates the case of β < η
µ
; the panel (d) illustrates the case of η
µ
≤ β.
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Figure 4: The solid curves illustrate the available tax revenue from the young, Z, under
the assumption of β < (η/µ−1/2)
2
1−η/µ , i.e., 1− ηµ < θ˜(β).
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Figure 5: The solid curves illustrate the available tax revenue from the young, Z. The
panel (a) represents the case of β > 1 − 2η/µ, i.e., 1 − η/µ < (1 + β)/2. The panel (b)
represents the case of β ≤ 1− 2η/µ, i.e., 1− η/µ ≥ (1 + β)/2.
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